Objective: In recent decades, the use of military drones as an innovative and vital technology in the military domain has gained significant attention, and accordingly, developing strategies for utilizing and countering deceptive drone attacks has become increasingly crucial. This research focuses on examining optimal strategies for deploying and countering deceptive drones.

Methodology: In the examined interaction, the attacker can manipulate the signals received by the radar, leading the defender astray in identifying the true identity of the attacking object. The attacker decides whether to send genuine or deceptive signals, while the defender decides whether to launch a missile towards the drone or not. Game theory is employed in this article to model and analyze this interaction, and by identifying the complete Bayesian equilibrium with two states of pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium in the signaling game, the optimal strategy of the attacker and defender has been calculated.

Findings: A method for modeling deception in war has been presented, and the necessary conditions for establishing equilibrium and the expected payoff for each player in the identified equilibria have been calculated.

Conclusion: It was shown mathematically based on the parameters of the presented model, in the conditions where it is possible to use deception, strengthening the defense system for the defender and increasing the knowledge of the attacker towards the defender is of significant importance.