Allocation of forces on Iran's land borders in case of neighbor attack using fuzzy security games

Document Type : Original Article


1 Researcher of Imam Ali Afsari University.Tehran.Iran

2 Assistant Professor at Imam Ali Officers University, Tehran, Iran.


Establishing security in the different borders of the country is one of the most important priorities of the military forces, especially the ground forces. In this article, the security games between a defender and several attackers are investigated and the players' preferences and how to calculate them are described. To solve the problem of the uncertainty of the defender to face the unknown type of attacker, the Bayesian game approach is used. and in order to solve the problem of uncertainty caused by the ambiguity in the understanding of experts and their imprecise judgment, the phase theory has been used as a practical example of this type of games in creating security at land borders, and the model of this problem is expressed as a game. multi-objective security has been investigated, for this purpose we have investigated the movements and actions of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the region and to prevent this country from attacking the common land borders of Iran and Azerbaijan, the appropriate allocation and coverage of four bordering provinces (Gilan, Ardabil) , West Azerbaijan and East Azerbaijan) by the ground units in the operational area. Finally, it can be concluded that many complex military issues can be investigated using security games and the model of its optimal solution can be designed.


Main Subjects

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