Solving Multiobjective Security Games with Interval Payoffs

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 researcher at Dafoos Aja high institute for war

2 instructor Dafoos AJA

Abstract

Security is one of the key parameters in any society that will have a direct impact on the process of that society. In most areas of security, security resources are limited for protection and full security. One way to solve this problem is to use game theory. Game theory provides a logical way to allocate security resources to enemy targets. The aim of this article is to examine security games, their importance, modeling, solving and application in defense decision making and decision making in an uncertain environment. In this article, security games between a defender and several attackers are examined and the utilities of the players and how they are calculated are described. Due to the uncertainty in the presentation of payoffs by experts, the utilities are considered as interval. The game is modeled as a multi-objective optimization problem with interval-valued objective functions. There are several ways to solve this problem. A practical example of this type of game is the creation of security at the air border, and the model of this issue has been studied as a multi-objective security game. Finally, it can be concluded that many complex military problems can be explored using security games and an optimal solution model can be designed.

Keywords